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Introduction: An Overview of Chinese Agro-food Trade 
 
After the opening-up and reform policy in the late 1970s, a new economic regime called Household 
Production Responsibility System spread throughout rural China in the early 1980s, under which the 
rights to use farmland were distributed to individual farmers while the property rights of farmland 
were given to each village.4 This new system, which led to the appearance of numerous small-scale 
                                                   
1 The research conducted for this paper is a part of the IDE-UNIDO joint research on trade compliance in 
Asia. 
2 Researcher, Environment and Natural Resource Studies Group, Inter-disciplinary Studies Center, 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan (Nanae_Yamada@ide.go.jp).  
3 Associate Professor, College of Agricultural Cooperatives, Qingdao Agricultural University, PRC 
(suishuyan@hotmail.com). 
4 See for instance, Hu, W. (1997) and Krusekopf (2002) on the details of land rights reform and Wang, 
Hui et al. (2011) for some of the problems associated with land use rights. 
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household farms, stimulated farmers’ willingness for production which had long been suppressed 
under the collective farming system. By the mid-1990s China had almost achieved food 
self-sufficiency, enabling the country, which has a huge population to feed, to aggressively open its 
doors to the global agricultural market. 
The institutional reforms to liberalize international agro-food trade in the late 1980s led to a 
rush of foreign investment in the agricultural processing sector, although the trade was only allowed 
for authorized trading companies. Japan, one of the largest agro-food importers in the world, was 
one of the pioneering investors in coastal China, followed by South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
Japan invested early in Shandong province, the largest agricultural production region in north China, 
then later spread to Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian and other coastal provinces endowed with good 
access to ports. These foreign agribusiness firms encouraged local farmers to grow crops specialized 
for importers’ markets by providing them with a complete package of production materials including 
seeds, pesticides and technical assistance, or the so-called Development and Import Strategy. 
In combination with this development of the food processing industry led by 
foreign-financed agribusinesses, a series of drastic rural institutional reforms including liberalization 
of the distribution of agricultural products in the 1990s encouraged further development of the 
agribusiness. Since the late 1990s, one of the main strategies of Chinese agricultural policy has been 
to develop the agribusiness and food processing industries to add value to agricultural products by 
utilizing the strength of abundant cheap labor to ameliorate the disparity in domestic incomes 
between agriculture and other industries. The Chinese government promoted the development of 
agribusiness and a vertically integrated agricultural system by providing lead firms and Farmers’ 
Professional Associations (FPA) which are described later with tax incentives and subsidies. This 
policy is specified in the Agricultural Industrialization Policy, the main purpose of which is to create 
leading agribusinesses which in turn lead large-scale farmers or local FPAs and their member 
farmers. This policy has contributed to the development of agribusiness since the late 1990s. 
The value of Chinese agro-food exports grew rapidly after the late 1990s, and China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 accelerated this growth. Figure 1 indicates the trend of Chinese 
agro-food exports and imports by value during the thirty years from 1980 to 2010. The value in 2000 
was US$12 billion, more than four times that in 1980, which was about US$3 billion in nominal 
terms. Accession to the WTO in 2001 accelerated the growth, with the total value of exports in 2011 
exceeding US$40 billion, 3.6 times that in 2000. During this time, the ratio of agro-food exports in 
total agricultural GDP remained stable at around 3 to 5%. The share of agro-food exports in total 
national exports by value decreased dramatically from 26.7% to 3.3% in the same period as the 
manufacturing export industries grew. 
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Figure 1: Trend in Chinese agro-food trade (1980–2010) 
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Source: National Statistical Bureau of China, Ministry of Agriculture (China), various years 
 
Figure 2 shows the trends in the composition of agro-food export values from 1992 to 2010. 
The figure shows that the share of raw materials decreased during this period, while that of various 
processed products grew rapidly. In 1992, raw agricultural products including coffee, tea and spices, 
cereals, oil seeds, industrial or medicinal plants, live animals and meat accounted for 40.2% of 
exports, a figure that dropped to 15.7% in 2010. In contrast, the share of various processed meat, 
vegetable and aquatic products increased. For instance, the sum of fresh vegetables and preparations 
of vegetables and fruits grew from 19.3% in 1992 to 33.0% in 2010. Within vegetables and fruit 
exports, preparations accounted for 33.9% of the value in 1992, peaked at 48.9% in 2007, and then 
decreased to 35.3%. The share of fish and other aquatic products remained stable during this period 
at 12% to 16% of total export value. Preparations of meat and aquatic products accounted for 3.6% 
in 1992, reached 10% in the late 1990s, peaked at 18.2% in 2006 and then started to decline to 
11–12% in the late 2000s. This decline is partly because of the adoption of the positive list system 
for residual agricultural chemicals in foods by the Japanese government in 2006, which is described 
in detail later. 
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Figure 2: The composition of agro-food exports (1992–2010) 
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As Chinese agriculture deepened its links with the global market and became a major 
exporter in the global agro-food market, a number of issues regarding food safety occurred, with a 
succession of serious incidents regarding the safety of Chinese agro-food products in the 2000s.5 
Under international pressure, the Chinese government has placed more emphasis on food safety and 
has started to establish more efficient and effective controls over the entire food supply chain in 
China. 
                                                   
5 Major safety incidents concerning Chinese food products that captured global attention included: 
excessive levels of the residual pesticide Chlorpyrifos were detected in Chinese-made frozen spinach in 
Japan in 2002 and the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) temporarily banned the 
import of vegetables from China; Malachite green, which is believed to be carcinogenic, was discovered 
in imported Chinese eels in Korea and Japan; imported Chinese-made frozen dumplings were found to 
contain toxic substances in Japan in 2008; the so-called milk scandal, in which milk and infant formula 
were found to be adulterated with melamine, which causes serious kidney problems, reportedly affecting 
300,000 victims in 2008; in 2012 Chinese gelatin capsules were found to contain excessive amounts of 
chrome and the Ministry of Public Security of China confiscated more than 77 million capsules from 
factories and drugstores, nine were arrested and 45 people were detained in connection with the incident; 
gutter oil, which is an illegal cooking oil refined from sewage and leftover or used oil from restaurants, 
reportedly accounted for about 10% of all cooking oil in the domestic market in 2010. Although some of 
these incidents affected only the domestic market, the outrageousness of the incidents, the sheer scale of 
damage, and the pervasiveness of such problems have significantly damaged the safety reputation of 
Chinese agro-food products in international markets. 
5 
 
In this paper, we will analyze a typical Chinese export product, frozen vegetables, that 
experienced serious food safety problems in the 2000s in the international market. This paper aims to 
clarify the basic characteristics of the production, distribution and export of frozen vegetables, how 
exporting firms manage supply chains to control and ensure quality, the potential export capacities, 
and policy actions required. 
 
 
Production and Distribution of Vegetables in China 
 
                                          Domestic Production of Vegetables 
Since the introduction of a market economy, the production area and the output of vegetables 
in China have steadily increased (see Figure 3). The total area of vegetable cultivation was 3,330 
thousand hectares in 1978. Within 12 years, this area doubled and the rate of increase accelerated in 
the 1990s, reaching 19 million hectares in 2010, nearly six times that in 1978. The production 
volume has also increased rapidly, reaching 651 million tons in 2010, 3.8 times that in 1978 (195 
million tons). 
 
Figure 3: Trend of vegetable production in China (1990–2010) 
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Among vegetables, leaf vegetables are the most widely produced variety, accounting for 
35.1% of cultivation area and 36.0% of output. This is followed by solanaceous crops (which include 
tomatoes and aubergines) with 14.7% of total production area and 16.1% of total production. The 
third variety is root vegetables, which accounted for 14.1% and 14.1%, followed by cucumbers and 
gherkins with 11.5% of area and 12.9% of output. 
The top five production areas in 2009 were the provinces of Shandong, Henan, Guangdong, 
Sichuan, and Hebei, which accounted for 9.5%, 9.1%, 6.2%, 6.2%, and 6.1% of total vegetable 
production area, respectively. The main production areas are mostly located in coastal areas where 
the soils are more fertile and which have better access to international markets. 
 
                Vegetable Distribution System for the Domestic and Global Markets 
After the introduction of the market economy, the distribution system for agricultural 
products was progressively liberalized, beginning with the main subsidiary agricultural products 
such as horticultural crops, meat and eggs in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Government controls on 
the distribution of grains such as rice and wheat remained until they were abolished as late as 2004. 
Beginning in the 1980s, rural free markets, which had long been closed during the planned economy 
period, were liberalized, while free markets for agro-food products were newly established in urban 
areas. At that time the free markets mainly dealt with products for local consumption within a fairly 
limited area. As the demand of urban consumers for agro-food commodities diversified, more 
extensive distribution networks to connect producing areas with consuming areas were required. 
The Shopping Basket Program started by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1988 promoted the 
establishment of agricultural wholesale markets, which are divided into comprehensive wholesale 
markets and special wholesale markets. The latter were developed mainly in producing areas and 
played an important role in distributing crops and other agricultural products to urban areas. Since 
this policy was started, such wholesale markets have become the major channel for subsidiary crops. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2010), more than 70% of vegetables, fruits and 
aquaculture products are distributed through wholesale markets. 
As for the size of special wholesale markets, small-scale markets are still dominant. At the 
end of 2008, the number of special wholesale markets with sales of more than one hundred million 
RMB reached 921, with total annual sales of 7,939 hundred million RMB, 1.4 times and 2.6 times 
larger than in 2004 respectively, though these large-scale special wholesale markets accounted for 
only 20.2% of the total agricultural wholesale market by number. The breakdown of these wholesale 
markets by product specialty is as follows: cereal markets 10.7%, livestock markets 12.1%, 
aquaculture markets 14.3%, vegetable markets 30.4%, and dried fruits and nuts markets 13.9%. 
Although such large-scale special wholesale markets have grown, the number of small-scale local 
free markets remains large, with more than 250,000 at the end of 2008, though the number is 
7 
 
declining slightly. 
 
Figure 4: Vegetable distribution system for domestic/global market in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: created by author 
 
The distribution system of vegetables in China since the 1980s is shown in Figure 4. 
Agricultural products for international markets (on the right of the figure), especially those for 
developed countries which require higher quality standards, are basically separated from those for 
the domestic market (on the left) in the processes of production, processing and distribution. It 
should be emphasized that most Chinese vegetables and vegetable products are consumed by 
domestic consumers, and consumption is increasing in line with income growth, while only a small 
percentage of production is exported, though the amount is sizeable viewed from the perspective of 
other countries. The major players and their functions in the Chinese vegetable distribution system 
regarding products for domestic and international markets are described separately below. 
 
                                 Products for the domestic market 
The main vegetable producers for the domestic market can be divided into two types. The 
first type is the small-scale farmers. According to the second Chinese agricultural census in 2006, the 
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average cultivated land area per household is only 0.55 hectare. The second type of producer is the 
large-scale farmers, although their number is still small. This is because the development of contract 
farming is still limited, partly because the food processing industry and farmland rental market 
remain underdeveloped. Only 10.8% of a household’s farmland is rented from the land market on 
average and only 12.2% of farmers participate in the farmland rental market. 
Most farming households sell their vegetables to brokers who visit villages during the harvest 
season to purchase their products. Some of the brokers are local farmers who entered into the 
distribution business. The brokers then sell the vegetables to wholesale markets and processors. A 
proportion of the vegetables is sold to the local free market or at fairs for local consumption. Some 
of the farmers are members of FPAs, and sell their products to them, though the share of vegetables 
sold through FPAs is now rather small. Chinese farmers are not well organized and have little 
bargaining power against the brokers who are armed with better market information. To protect 
farmers’ welfare from such brokers, the government has encouraged farmers to establish FPAs, a 
kind of farmers’ organization for cooperative production and marketing, which were finally 
formalized by the Farmers Professional Association Law in 2008. Some of the FPAs sell their 
products to agribusiness on a contract basis for the domestic market. Although FPAs covered about 
40% of farmers by 2010, the capabilities of FPAs remain weak. Many of them do not have the 
capability to strictly control and manage the production processes and quality, which are essential 
skills needed for contract farming for export. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2010), rural wholesale markets handle vegetables 
from 60% of the total vegetable production area. About 80% of rural wholesale markets are located 
in the east and central areas of China. They serve as hubs for horticultural products, from where 
these products are distributed to urban wholesale markets, supermarkets and other retailers and 
traditional free markets in large and medium cities via distributors. Registered wholesale markets are 
equipped with quality control (safety check) facilities and according to the Policy on Market 
Entrance Permission for Vegetables based on the Law of the PRC on the Quality and Safety of 
Agricultural Products, local officials can carry out compulsory pesticide residue inspections by 
random sampling at rural and urban wholesale markets and large retailers that deal with vegetables. 
Agribusiness firms engaging in the processing and distribution of food products usually 
procure their materials from large-scale farms under contract, from their own farms or from rural 
wholesale markets (only for the domestic market). The domestic market for processed vegetables is 
still underdeveloped because relatively few agribusinesses have cold storage and processing 
facilities. In addition, at this stage of development, most domestic consumers prefer fresh vegetables 
and fruits rather than highly processed products such as frozen vegetables and other preparations 
except for the younger generation with high enough incomes living in large cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai. 
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Since the early 1990s, supermarkets have spread throughout large cities in China and sales of 
horticultural products by supermarkets already exceed exports, though traditional venues remain 
important (Wang, Honglin et al. 2009). The Chinese government has promoted the conversion of 
traditional wet markets to supermarkets and the development of direct trade between farms or FPAs 
and supermarkets in order to streamline the current multi-layer distribution system in China and thus 
improve efficiency and control safety along the supply chain. 
 
                                 Products for the international market 
The year 2002 saw a dramatic change in the procurement system for exports in the 
agriculture business. This was the year when spinach in Japan imported from China was found to 
contain excessive amounts of residual agricultural chemicals. After the incident, export firms were 
required to use materials from registered producers according to AQSIQ Announcement on 
Inspection and Quarantine of Import and Export Vegetables enforced in 2002. This specified that a 
vegetable export firm must purchase vegetables from registered large-scale farms satisfying certain 
conditions; these farms are called Production Bases (PB), and will be described later in this paper. 
Before 2002, some exporters bought materials from rural wholesale markets, from brokers, or from 
farmers directly. After 2002, small-scale processors and brokers who did not have the ability to form 
PBs were shut out from lucrative export markets completely. 
As for the agribusiness firms, only those firms that have import and export licenses are 
allowed to conclude contracts with foreign traders, though the application process has become much 
easier than before. With respect to frozen vegetables and highly processed preparations of vegetables, 
export agribusinesses have created an integrated quality management system starting from 
production in PBs, processing, and packing, all the way to the shipping process. The main exporters 
of frozen vegetables are large-scale agribusinesses who also have large-scale PBs, processing 
facilities with strict temperature control, and chemical residue inspection facilities. 
      In 2003, there were more than 13,000 food processing firms engaging in some export 
activities. Of these, 836 enterprises had annual exports of more than US$5 million, and 60% of them 
are vertically integrated from production and processing to export. One of the largest exporters is A 
Groups in Shandong province, which originated from a so-called rural township enterprise (TVE) in 
the 1980s and has grown into a group of companies including dozens of domestic and foreign 
invested firms. One-sixth of all frozen spinach exports from China is made by them (Oshima 2007). 
In Shandong, foreign investment in the food processing sector is quite active, with most of the 
investment coming from Japan and Taiwan, and they specialize in exporting to the Japanese market. 
At present, exports of frozen vegetables are dominated by large-scale agribusinesses with PBs which 
can guarantee the amount, quality and safety of materials, which is the key advantage of such 
enterprises. 
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Exports of Vegetable Products 
 
The composition of vegetable products exported from China has undergone several changes 
since its beginning in the late 1980s. At first, Chinese exports consisted of mainly preserved or 
pickled products. Then, the development of domestic infrastructure enabled China to export fresh 
vegetables in the early 1990s, starting out with the vegetables that keep better such as garlic, ginger 
and root vegetables, then expanding to include a wider range of varieties later. As the main importer, 
Japan has increased its dependence on Chinese fresh and processed vegetables which are produced at 
lower prices. In the mid-1990s Japanese frozen food companies and trading companies invested in 
Shandong province6 and other coastal areas and started to export vegetables to Japan in the manner 
of the Development and Import Strategy. 
 
Figure 5: Various Vegetable Products Exported from China (value) 
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Source: UN-Comtrade7 
                                                   
6 Shandong province attracted foreign direct investment in agriculture from Japan for three reasons. First, 
the similar climate in Shandong province enabled firms to bring vegetables grown in Japan without much 
modification. Second, Shandong province is located close to Japan and has two good ports, Yantai and 
Qingdao. Finally, farmers in Shandong province have traditionally grown vegetables and have good 
technical skills and productivity. 
7 In this paper, the category of “fresh vegetables” includes HS codes 0701, 0702, 0703, 0704, 0705, 0706, 
0708, 0709, 0714,0910, “frozen vegetables” includes HS codes 0710, 071490, 2004, Dried vegetables, 
mushrooms, peas and beans includes HS codes 0712.39-010, 0712, 0713, and Preserved vegetables 
includes HS codes 2001, 2002, 2003, when sourced by UN-Comtrade. 
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      Figure 5 shows the export trend of various vegetable products since 1992. Among these 
products, fresh vegetables have always been the major category and grew rapidly during the 2000s, 
with the speed of growth skyrocketing after 2009. Dried vegetables show a similar trend. Frozen 
vegetable exports saw slower growth than these two commodities, yet exceeded US$1.4 billion in 
2012, 14 times higher than in 1992. The share of frozen vegetables has not been increasing since 
2006. This is partly because of the decrease in exports to Japan, the biggest importer of frozen 
vegetables, following the introduction of the positive list system in May 2006. The shares of each 
product in the total value of vegetable exports in 2011 were as follows: fresh vegetables accounted 
for about half, dried vegetables 31%, preserved vegetables 10%, and frozen vegetables 9%. 
 
                                          The distribution of major import countries 
The major market for fresh vegetables is East Asia accounting for more than 40%, followed 
by the EU, US, Russia and Middle East (see Figure 6). Japan had been the largest importer of 
Chinese vegetables – both fresh and frozen – until 2008, although the value started decreasing after 
the positive list system was introduced in May 2006. Fresh vegetable exports (by value) to new 
importers – ASEAN countries especially Malaysia and Thailand – increased dramatically, as a result 
of gradual tariff reductions on agricultural products since 2005 under the ASEAN-CHINA FTA 
(ACFTA) scheme. Russia imports Chinese vegetables through border trade mainly from the three 
northeastern provinces (Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC) 2011). 
Similar to the case of fresh vegetables, Japan has been the largest importer of Chinese frozen 
vegetables, although Japan’s share has declined from 71% in 2002 to 44.9% in 2011 (see Figure 7). 
The second largest importer in 2011 was the EU (16.4%), followed by Korea (13.1%), and the US 
(10.4%). The distribution of frozen vegetable exports is also diversified the same as fresh vegetables, 
especially to developing countries other than Japan where the standards are less strict, although 
Japan’s power to purchase highly processed vegetables is higher than developing countries. 
Since the incidents of detecting residual agricultural chemicals in Chinese-made vegetables 
in 2002, Japan has banned imports from China several times and has introduced stricter standards on 
imported products. In response, Chinese exporters have diversified into other export markets to 
reduce the risk, some of them shifting to markets in developing countries or even focusing solely on 
the domestic market, where quality standards are less strict compared to those for export products, 
although Chinese residents are demanding safer and higher-quality food as they become more 
prosperous. This tendency has continued since the positive list system was introduced in 2006. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of importers of Chinese fresh vegetables in 2011 (by value) 
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Figure 7: Distribution of importers of Chinese frozen vegetables in 2011 (by value) 
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Japan adopted the positive list system for residual agricultural chemicals in 2006. This 
system sets maximum residue limits (MRL) for 799 agricultural chemicals for thousands of 
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commodities, and imported foods must not exceed the MRL8. If imported food is found to contain a 
chemical which is not on the list, it must not exceed the limit of 0.01 ppm. This new policy requires 
exporters to comply with the strictest quality control in the world and poses a new challenge for 
Chinese exporters. Only the exporters who had engaged in producing frozen vegetables for export to 
Japan for years survived. These surviving firms either had good connections with Japanese 
customers or were invested in by Japanese firms. In most cases, these firms were invested in by 
Japanese frozen food producing companies and trading companies, and they could prepare for the 
new standard in advance by collecting the latest information and could receive technical assistance 
from Japan. 
After the adoption of the positive list system in Japan in 2006, the China Inspection and 
Quarantine Services (CIQs) required exporters to double-check export commodities by CIQ and by 
private inspection centers before shipping. Some processors without any self-inspection facilities 
must request the inspection centers of other processing firms or private inspection companies 
specialized in inspecting export products. The cost of safety inspections has been rising as the 
number of items to be checked has increased and the variety of standards has diversified. These 
cumbersome procedures and high costs have caused some firms to shift to export markets with less 
strict standards. 
Some exporters, mostly invested in by Japanese or Taiwanese firms, have long engaged in 
producing products for the Japanese market. Because the requirements and specifications of 
Japanese customers are so specific, these firms cannot easily change their products and destination 
markets. One of the firms interviewed in 2012 was invested in by Taiwan, and another was invested 
in by Taiwan, Japan and China. For these two firms, more than 90% of their frozen vegetables are 
exported to Japan, and the rest of them are exported to EU and ASEAN countries. The third firm 
interviewed – a large domestic group company with investors from various countries – shifted its 
focus to the domestic market by diversifying away from horticulture crops, although one key 
advantage of this firm is its food safety control system, which was transferred by the foreign 
investors. 
 
 
Supply chain management by MNCs 
 
Incidents regarding residual pesticides from Chinese frozen vegetables in 2002 in Japan 
dramatically changed the supply chain management by exporting firms in China. Chinese frozen 
spinach imported by Japan was found to contain residues of the pesticide chlorpyrifos in late 2001 
                                                   
8 For a more detailed explanation of the policy, see the website of the Japanese Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare. http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/foodsafety/positivelist060228/index.html 
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and 2002. In August 2002, the Japanese government issued an advisory to halt imports of Chinese 
frozen spinach, but this stopped all imports of frozen vegetables from China to Japan. In February 
2003, the Japanese market was reopened to imports of frozen vegetables from China, though it was 
closed again because new tests revealed continued problems with the same pesticides (Calvin et al. 
2006). This incident made food safety one of the top priorities between China and Japan. After the 
incident, the national General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) ordered the Commodity Inspection Quarantine Bureaus (CIQ) at the provincial and city 
levels to report on plans for countermeasures to tackle food safety problems. Among the various 
proposals submitted by CIQs, the idea of constructing large-scale farms specialized for export 
suggested by the Shandong Yantai CIQ was adopted. The AQSIQ Announcement on Inspection and 
Quarantine of Import and Export Vegetables was enforced in 2002 which specified that a vegetable 
export firm must have more than 20 hectares of farmland which is assembled into large plots with no 
prior contamination by banned substances; manage proper pesticide use; ensure traceability; and 
conduct sampling inspections of chemical residues. In addition, export firms are not allowed to 
purchase vegetables from places other than registered farms, and each registered farm (PB) should 
have a technical extension officer called a Field man and so on.9 The costs of ensuring food safety 
including land rents and inspection fees are a large burden for exporters. 
Before this incident, agribusinesses had invested in the processing stage and introduced cold 
chain facilities. Some large-scale foreign invested firms obtained global certifications for sanitation 
management in processing such as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) and ISOs, 
but less attention was paid to the safety of the production and procurement stage. 
Figure 8 shows the change of procurement system for material vegetables for export 
processors in Shandong province before and after 2002 based on extensive interviews with several 
export enterprises by Sui (2005), partly supplemented by fieldwork by the author in the same area. 
Before 2002, most of the agribusiness procured material vegetables from village committees (Type 
A) or from rural wholesale markets via brokers (Type B). Export processors collected material 
vegetables through loose production contracts with nearby villages whose farmers produce material 
vegetables. In this method, quality control in the production process was completely left to village 
leaders and farmers and traceability was very weak, though the processors provided basic technical 
assistance by dispatching officials to villages.  
 
                                                   
9 Based on the national standard decided by Announcement on Inspection and Quarantine of Import and 
Export Vegetables, local CIQs set original standards for the farm size for each agricultural commodity at 
its discretion based on the land endowments, development level of the processing industry and the variety 
of products in each region. For example, Yantai city’s CIQ in Shandong province classifies vegetables 
into three categories by the level of residual pesticide risk and management level (Mori 2009). The 
highest is leaf vegetables, the second is solanaceous crops, while root vegetables have the lowest risk of 
residual pesticides (Sakazume, Park and Sakashita 2006). 
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Figure 8: Systems for procuring material vegetables for export processors in Shandong before and 
after 2002 
 
<Before 2002> 
Type A: Village Committee procurement 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
Type B: Local broker procurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<After 2002> 
Type C: Direct-managed farm (the land is rented by processor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type D: Contract farm (the land is rented by large-scale farmer) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sui (2005), partly supplemented by interviews with three export enterprises in Yantai, Shandong 
by the author in June 2012. 
Note: The broken lines in the figure refer the scope of land concerned in each type. 
Farmers 
Village 
Processor Local 
Broker 
Farmers 
Processor Village 
Committee 
Processor Workers 
Wholesale market 
Manager/ 
Large-scale 
farmer 
 
Field man 
Processor Workers 
Large-scale 
farmer 
Field man 
16 
 
At that time, another type of procurement was Type B or local broker procurement from the 
rural wholesale market or small-scale farmers. Traceability was impossible with this type, too. Even 
before 2002, some of the large agribusinesses had directly-managed large-scale farms, though the 
objectives of holding such farms were mainly to stabilize the quality and quantity of materials, not to 
avoid the problems associated with residual agricultural chemicals. 
Since 2002, materials for export are required to be produced in authorized plots of land; 
export processors abandoned former procurement systems and constructed new systems, shown as 
Type C and D in the figure. According to AQSIQ Announcement on Inspection and Quarantine of 
Import and Export Vegetables enforced in 2002, all export processors must use materials from 
registered farms of appropriate size and conditions. This requirement has forced export processors 
either to rent land plots from nearby villages by aggregating smaller plots or contract with 
large-scale farmers who have their own rented land.10 
In Type C, a processor rents farmland and directly manages the production by dispatching a 
manager who is hired by the firm or a specialized large-scale farmer and makes that person 
responsible for daily management of production and quality control based on the firm’s production 
plan. The Field man is a technical extension official who is responsible for giving technical 
assistance to the manager and workers (usually the villagers). Quality control tends to be better when 
the manager is dispatched from the firm rather than by any other method, so this arrangement is 
usually adopted for leaf vegetables which require stricter management. However, in this scheme, the 
enterprise takes all the risks with regard to production, and the costs for land rental and 
administration are large. On the other hand, if the farm is managed by an individual farmer, part of 
the risk is shared with him by requiring deposits to be paid to the processor, to mitigate the risk of 
poor production skill or detection of residual pesticides in the vegetables. 
In Type D, production is contracted to individual farmers, and necessary technical assistance 
is provided by the processor. Type D is used when the farmer can afford to rent large enough plots of 
land and has good connections or trust with the village from which the farmer is renting. However, 
this method has the loosest control over quality and is used only for vegetables that have lower risk 
levels such as root vegetables. In this type, the Field man does not stay at the farm all the time and is 
regularly sent to each plot to check the production only when needed. 
In all the types, most of the production materials such as seeds, pesticides and fertilizers are 
provided by the processing firm. Many of the former brokers who became shut out from export 
channels have become managers of the newly founded farms, since they are familiar with the 
required quality control of vegetables for exports and also have a trusting relationship with export 
firms. 
                                                   
10 According to the Chinese Land Management Law, farmland is owned by “rural collectives”, or 
municipal villages and village groups, except for some land owned by the government. Farmers only have 
the right to use the land. 
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Figure 9 shows the flow of the supply chain for vegetable exports and its supply chain 
management by the government and firms. Along the supply chain from the farm to the exporting 
port, the materials are voluntarily checked three to four times by firms. Export processors usually 
check by random sampling the material vegetables in the PBs before harvesting. If excessive 
amounts of residual chemicals are found, they do not harvest all the vegetables of the plot and 
abandon them, or if possible, sell them to another market. Some of the processors check the 
harvested materials again before they enter the processing factory. Third, processed products are 
checked before shipment. Finally, the local CIQ checks the final products at the port. Some large 
export processors in Shandong have already established their own inspection centers for checking 
the safety of products. Some of these inspection centers are even authorized by the local CIQ and are 
able to test for all the substances controlled by the importing countries, to avoid the risk of rejection 
and shipping back after inspection in the destination country. 
 
Figure 9: Inspection system for export vegetables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author, partly based on Mori 2009. 
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aims to improve the quality of competitive items to expand exports, motivated by the pressure from 
importers of Chinese agricultural products. According to the National Plan for the Development of 
Vegetable Production Regions (2009–2015) of the Ministry of Agriculture, five main vegetable 
production regions for the domestic market and three regions for vegetable exports were identified 
and the government is intensively supporting the development of these areas. The three export 
regions are: 114 cities and counties located in the southeast coastal area including Shandong, Fujian, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangxi provinces; 31 cities 
and counties in the northwest inner regions including Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, 
Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces; and 16 cities and countries in the northeast area including Jilin, 
Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia. The plan aims to increase the exports and processing rate of 
vegetables, and to raise per capita incomes of local farmers by providing necessary support through 
infrastructure construction and technical extension. 
The major hurdle for domestic food processors, most of which are small, to participate in 
exports to markets in developed countries is the large initial investment needed to create a vertically 
integrated system which would enable them to implement stricter supply chain management. Such 
vertically integrated system includes: the acquisition of large-scale farmland with suitable conditions 
with high rents; the construction of a processing system specializing in a targeted market; continuous 
monitoring of the rules and regulations of importing countries which tend to change rather 
frequently; and the costs associated with inspections. Furthermore, rapid increases in domestic 
wages and shortages of labor are occurring in coastal areas, making Chinese products less 
competitive than those from other countries. Some domestic processors may find that focusing on 
the domestic vegetable market is more attractive. 
The transportation infrastructure, especially reliable cold chains linking production regions to 
ports, is also crucial for export products that need delicate temperature control. At present, all cold 
chains for frozen vegetable exports in China are provided by exporters themselves because of the 
lack of domestic cold chain facilities. The National Development and Reform Commission enforced 
the Guidelines for the Development Plan for Agro-food Cold Chains in June 2010 and started to 
tackle the reform of domestic cold chains. According to the guidelines, the annual distribution of 
fresh agro-food products in China was about 400 million tons, while the ratio distributed by cold 
chains in horticulture, meat and aquaculture products reached 5%, 15% and 23%, and that by chilled 
chains reached 15%, 30% and 40%, respectively. There are still not enough cold storage chambers 
and only 0.3% of container trucks are equipped with temperature control facilities. What is worse, 
facilities have become old and need refurbishing urgently. 
The last is the limited searching capability of domestic firms to find suitable customers. The 
safety of Chinese food products has become one of the most sensitive issues in the international 
market, and some foreign consumers have tended to shy away from them. To counter this, most 
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Chinese agro-food exporters targeting the Japanese market have one or two Japanese staff to 
communicate effectively with Japanese buyers who are very sensitive to Japanese consumers’ 
suspicions on the safety of imported food. Even though the Japanese market may be exceptionally 
sensitive and strict, if new domestic processors are considering starting to export frozen vegetables, 
technical support is essential not only for production and processing, but also for marketing 
know-how. 
 
 
Policy Implications 
 
Some policy implications for better management of the quality and safety of export 
agro-food products in China are as follows. 
 
 Assistance for the development of large-scale producers and contract farming 
Currently, the development of large-scale farming and contract farming is limited in China; 
small-scale family farming remains dominant. To improve the efficiency as well as the quality and 
safety control of Chinese food, the most effective way is to reduce the number of channels and 
distribution layers. This would also improve traceability. As we have seen in the early part of this 
paper, producers for the domestic market and those for the international market are completely 
separated from each other. Production for the international market is done only by large-scale 
farmers who have contracts with exporting firms. Meanwhile, for the domestic market, most family 
household farmers sell their products directly to local brokers. In the latter case, farmers are not well 
organized and extension services on production techniques and knowledge about correct usage of 
production materials including pesticides and other chemicals for farmers are very poor. Possible 
ways to solve this problem are as follows. 
 
 Support for the development of leading firms 
 As we have seen in this paper, the development of agro-food exporting firms and processing 
firms led to the expansion of contract farming, and thus to improved quality control at the production 
stage in coastal areas. Empowering small and medium-sized firms to go into the agro-food business 
would improve domestic food safety, though contracts between the agro-food firms and farmers 
should be reasonable to protect the incomes of farmers. Necessary technical and financial support 
should be provided to help these new entrants enter the international market. Nevertheless, for some 
importing countries with specific, strict standards, only large-scale foreign-invested firms 
specializing in very specific products for the target market survived after several food safety 
incidents and policy changes. 
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 Land market development 
 When a firm starts contract farming for export, the most critical problem is how to acquire a 
large, contiguous piece of uncontaminated land. Currently, the farmland rental market is not well 
developed in China. Farmers usually lease or rent the right to use land at very low prices to other 
farmers. Most land transactions are among relatives. Sometimes they let the renter cultivate their 
land for free, although the national land policy allows farmers to trade land use rights at reasonable 
prices based on the market. The reason why farmers are not willing to rent their land use right to 
others when agriculture is less profitable than other jobs is that they regard their land use right as an 
important insurance and so tend to lend the land to others within their personal network, or a trusted 
person such as a relative. This is partly because the formal social security system for rural residents, 
including financial infrastructure and insurance services, is insufficient. As a result, most large-scale 
land aggregations are implemented by villages (collectives) that have the legal ownership of rural 
land, and then these aggregated pieces of land are rented to firms. An intermediate platform to 
provide information on rents and lenders is required for the development of the land rental market, 
as well as the preparation of a social security system for rural residents to enable them to easily sell 
their land use rights.11 
 
 Technical assistance and information services for farmers 
Currently, the provision of formal agricultural technical extension services in China is very 
weak.12 Most of the farmers do not have any opportunities to receive such services, even for very 
basic training on how to properly use pesticides or chemical fertilizers. Furthermore, they have few 
chances to acquire information on the latest variety of profitable crops or how to grow them; the 
only time farmers come across such information is when they participate in contract farming with 
large processing firms. In that case, technical extension specialists are typically sent to farmers to 
teach and monitor their production processes. The capability of private technical extension services 
(FPAs, for example) remains weak, and government support to empower public extension services 
and development of the private sector are required. 
                                                   
11 The need to reform and establish the national social security system in China has long been identified 
as a major issue (see for instance, World Bank 1997). This issue is made more urgent by the rapid aging 
of the population. If the current fertility rate continues, China’s population is expected to peak in 2026 
and then decline thereafter. While other countries–mainly advanced countries–are facing problems 
associated with population aging, the problem facing China is more severe since it will arise while China 
is at a relatively low income level (“Demography: China's Achilles Heel 2012” The Economist, 21st 
August, 2012). For the current discussion on pension reforms in China, see World Bank and DRC (2012). 
12 For a review on this, see Gao and Zhang (2008). Hu, R. et al. (2009) showed that separating 
commercial activities and extension services from the provider greatly improves the actual delivery of 
extension services to farmers. In addition, more inclusive agriculture extension services are found to be 
more effective in China (Hu, R. et al. 2012). 
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 Financial support for large-scale farming 
Large-scale farming for international markets is a rather risky business at present in China 
because of the unstable price of agricultural products, variability of weather, high land rental price 
and frequent changes in the standards of import countries. Large-scale producers should be 
supported with rural finance services like long-term or low-interest loan projects. 
 
 Investment in cold chain facilities 
Investment in cold chain facilities is necessary to develop exports because currently export 
firms have to invest in these facilities by themselves, which increases the production cost. To keep 
the quality of final products and to prevent port rejections because of bacteria and microbes, there is 
an urgent need to construct infrastructure for proper temperature control throughout the supply 
chain. 
 
 Strict control of the market for pesticides and other production inputs 
Although there are basic regulations on materials such as pesticides and fertilizers, the 
distribution channels of these materials are complex in China, or completely uncontrolled in most 
parts. Farmers usually buy their production materials from nearby shops or unspecified brokers, 
some of whom happen to sell illegal, poisonous or inferior quality ones. Some farmers are even 
willing to buy banned pesticides that will give instant effects so that they can sell their products at 
higher prices by improving their appearance. Official strict control on these materials with credible 
enforcement, as well as punishment for violators, is required. 
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